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Abstract 18 
Foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in non-endemic countries can lead to large economic 19 
costs and livestock losses but the use of vaccination has been contentious, partly due to 20 
uncertainty about emergency FMD vaccination. Value of information methods can be 21 
applied to disease outbreak problems such as FMD in order to investigate the performance 22 
improvement from resolving uncertainties. Here we calculate the expected value of 23 
resolving uncertainty about vaccine efficacy, time delay to immunity after vaccination and 24 
daily vaccination capacity for a hypothetical FMD outbreak in the UK. If it were possible to 25 
resolve all uncertainty prior to the introduction of control, we could expect savings of £55 26 
million in outbreak cost, 221,900 livestock culled and 4.3 days of outbreak duration. All 27 
vaccination strategies were found to be preferable to a culling only strategy. However, the 28 
optimal vaccination radius was found to be highly dependent upon vaccination capacity for 29 
all management objectives. We calculate that by resolving the uncertainty surrounding 30 
vaccination capacity we would expect to return over 85% of the above savings, regardless 31 
of management objective. It may be possible to resolve uncertainty about daily vaccination 32 
capacity before an outbreak, and this would enable decision makers to select the optimal 33 
control action via careful contingency planning. 34 
 35 
Author Summary 36 
In the UK during 2001 there was an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) which cost 37 
the economy an estimated £8 billion and led to the culling of approximately 7 million 38 
livestock. The main methods used to control the epidemic were movement bans and 39 
culling of infected and high-risk livestock. FMD vaccines were available but not used 40 
because of concerns about their effectiveness and how their use would affect the UK’s 41 
disease-free status. Using the Warwick FMD model, we ran simulations of FMD outbreaks 42 
in the UK including ring vaccination as a method of outbreak control with varying levels of 43 
vaccine efficacy, time delay between vaccination and conferral of immunity, and 44 
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vaccination capacity.  We applied value of information analysis to these results and found 45 
that the most important factor in determining the optimal vaccination strategy was 46 
knowledge of the vaccination capacity. In contrast, vaccine efficacy and delay between 47 
vaccination and immunity were relatively unimportant from a decision making 48 
perspective.  This work could inform contingency planning that would lead to cost savings 49 
in the event of a future FMD outbreak and could also be applied to other infectious 50 
diseases. 51 
 52 
Introduction 53 
During a new outbreak of an infectious disease, epidemiological models are generally 54 
utilised to inform policy decisions. However, such models are normally developed and 55 
parameterised using data from previous outbreaks. Whilst these models provide useful 56 
information, each novel crisis is likely to unfold in a unique way dependent on the factors 57 
particular to that epidemic. In the United Kingdom during 2001 there was a major epidemic 58 
of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a highly infectious disease of cloven-hoofed animals 59 
caused by infection with the virus Aphthae epizooticae. The most relevant information about 60 
the 2001 FMD outbreak came from analysis of the dynamics of that particular outbreak as 61 
it occurred [1–3]. Between outbreaks, research can be focused on minimising future 62 
outbreak uncertainty. Value of information (VOI) analysis is a method that allows a decision 63 
maker to place a value on reducing the level of uncertainty, by measuring how much the 64 
expected outcomes from the decision could be improved if uncertainty could be reduced [4]. 65 
This allows for the identification of uncertainties that are important to management. 66 
Research to resolve those important uncertainties can then be prioritised.  Value of 67 
information methods were initially developed in economic and process control settings in 68 
the 1960s, but have since been applied in health risk management [4], natural resource 69 
management [5] and other fields. The application of value of information methods in 70 
infectious disease management has only recently been explored [6–8]. 71 
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 72 
The importation of FMD into a previously disease-free nation has the potential to incur large 73 
economic losses owing to the export bans of products from FMD-susceptible animals. 74 
Therefore, control measures aim to balance achieving disease-free status as rapidly as 75 
possible (which can be reinstated no sooner than 3 months after culling of the last infected 76 
animal) with minimising livestock losses through culling [9]. The methods used to tackle the 77 
UK 2001 FMD outbreak included culling of all livestock on infected premises (IPs) (those 78 
with confirmed cases of FMD) as well as those farms thought to be at high risk of being 79 
infected, classified as dangerous contacts (DCs). Proximity culling was also implemented, 80 
including culling of livestock on contiguous premises (CPs) (those sharing a border with an 81 
IP) and ring culling in certain parts of the country [10]. Around 7 million animals were 82 
slaughtered to try to prevent the spread of infection. The agricultural industry and related 83 
rural and tourism industries were affected with an estimated total cost to the UK economy 84 
of £8 billion [10]. 85 
 86 
Routine FMD vaccination is not permitted under EU legislation. Emergency vaccination 87 
may be used during an outbreak to control the spread of disease or to protect certain 88 
livestock but its use is contentious. Also, any previously FMD-free country introducing 89 
vaccination during an outbreak will be subject to a change in their OIE (World Organisation 90 
for Animal Health) FMD-free status and this can have serious repercussions for their export 91 
markets [11]. Owing to this, and to the fact that the limited resources available at the time 92 
were thought to be insufficient to have a significant effect, use of emergency vaccination was 93 
discussed during the 2001 epidemic but never implemented. Since 2001, modelling work on 94 
the FMD outbreak has estimated that, had ring vaccination been implemented alongside 95 
culling of IPs and DCs, there would have been a decrease in the duration of the outbreak and 96 
the number of farms infected [12–14]. 97 
 98 
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The choice of whether to implement FMD vaccination or not is hampered by uncertainty 99 
[10]. There will always be unresolvable uncertainty due to the stochasticity that results in 100 
differences between outbreaks of the same disease.  However, epistemic uncertainty [15], 101 
which encompasses scientific uncertainty about the structure of a model due to incomplete 102 
knowledge, can be reduced through research [16]. Resolving the important uncertainties 103 
leads to higher expected achievement of management objectives. Short-term learning, via 104 
adaptive management (AM), may reduce epistemic uncertainty and lead to long-term 105 
improvements in management [5]. Previous work on FMD suggests that a temporally-static 106 
approach to management would result in severe strategies, such as culling of IPs, DCs and 107 
CPs, being optimal in high density farming regions [6]. However, an approach that uses 108 
adaptive management may allow for less severe culling strategies to be introduced initially, 109 
under certain conditions. Once uncertainty regarding disease spread had been resolved, 110 
additional culling would only be performed if necessary. Simulations of this adaptive 111 
strategy were found to result in a significant overall saving in average outbreak cost [6]. It is 112 
therefore crucial to quantify the VOI during the early stages of a disease outbreak in order 113 
to inform policy makers regarding how much they should invest in “learning” about how a 114 
disease is spreading and the resources available for control so that appropriate interventions 115 
can be chosen that will minimise the overall cost of the outbreak. 116 
 117 
This research considers the impact of resolving uncertainty surrounding emergency 118 
vaccination prior to an FMD epidemic in the UK. We investigated two different types of 119 
uncertainty associated with vaccination: 1) uncertainty surrounding emergency vaccine 120 
deployment in relation to the number of herds and total head of cattle for which there would 121 
be the capacity to vaccinate each day in the midst of an FMD outbreak; and 2) uncertainty 122 
concerning the efficacy of FMD vaccine as, despite some work on the effectiveness of 123 
vaccination in endemic countries [11,17], there is still significant uncertainty regarding the 124 
time delay from vaccination to immunity and the efficacy of the vaccine at the herd level 125 
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during an FMD outbreak [18]. Additionally, it is important to have a clearly defined 126 
management objective, as this may have an effect upon the choice of control strategy whilst 127 
also allowing for stakeholders and policymakers to be presented with performance 128 
information that is most relevant to them. In this paper, we establish the optimal vaccination 129 
strategy in the event of uncertainty regarding vaccine capacity and efficacy, whilst 130 
considering three alternative management objectives: minimising outbreak duration, 131 
minimising total head of livestock culled and minimising epidemic cost (see methods section 132 
for a description of the cost function). We determine the optimal vaccination strategies in 133 
the presence of these uncertainties and explore the expected performance improvement of 134 
resolving these uncertainties prior to deployment. 135 
 136 
Results 137 
 138 
Our model results indicated that an IPDC control strategy would result in an average of 7.96 139 
million head of livestock culled (95% prediction interval 5.93-10.26 million head) at a cost 140 
of £2.01 billion (95% prediction interval £1.55 - £2.52 billion) and a mean outbreak duration 141 
of 343 days (95% prediction interval 229–540 days). All vaccination strategies were found 142 
to perform better than IPDC culling alone under all combinations of vaccine assumptions 143 
and using any of the outcome measures (Fig 1-2, S1 Fig). 144 
 145 
Fig 1: Projected mean livestock culled (million head) under various vaccination 146 
ring radii (columns) and vaccination parameterisations (rows).  147 
Rows represent different combinations of parameters regarding vaccination efficacy, 148 
vaccination capacity (number of animals vaccinated per day), and the delay (in days) from 149 
administering vaccination and conferral of immunity. Results have been presented rounded 150 
to two decimal places with the optimal strategy selected prior to rounding. Outlined values 151 
denote the optimal control action for a given set of vaccination assumptions.   152 
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 153 
Fig 2: Projected mean outbreak cost (£million) under various vaccination ring 154 
radii (columns) and vaccination parameterisations (rows).  155 
Rows represent different combination of parameters regarding vaccination efficacy, 156 
vaccination capacity (number of animals vaccinated per day), and the delay (in days) from 157 
administering vaccination and conferral of immunity. Results have been presented rounded 158 
to the nearest integer value with the optimal strategy selected prior to rounding. Outlined 159 
values denote the optimal control action for a given set of vaccination assumptions.   160 
 161 
Vaccination rings of 3km were found to result in the largest number of animals culled and 162 
outbreak cost regardless of the vaccination assumptions, unless vaccination capacity was 163 
only 20,000 doses per day. In that case, vaccination at 15km resulted in the largest 164 
epidemics (Fig 1-2). The optimal vaccination strategy was highly dependent upon the daily 165 
vaccination capacity for all outcome measures – as the number of doses increased, there was 166 
a preference for larger vaccination rings. However, there appears to be little dependence 167 
upon either the vaccine efficacy or the time delay to immunity. When daily vaccine capacity 168 
was high and vaccine efficacy was low, larger rings were preferred to minimize the number 169 
of livestock culled (Fig 1), whilst higher vaccine efficacies generally resulted in smaller rings 170 
being optimal for the same outcome measure. Results for the number of livestock culled (Fig 171 
1) and the outbreak cost (Fig 2) follow similar trends because livestock culled was a function 172 
of the cost calculation. The converse was true if the outcome measure of interest was 173 
minimising outbreak duration, with large rings being optimal when vaccine efficacy and 174 
daily capacity were high (S1 Fig). These results highlight the necessity to clearly define the 175 
objective of management when determining the control policy that should be implemented 176 
[18]. 177 
 178 
With equal probability weightings for each of the vaccination assumptions (Table 1), the 179 
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control strategy yielding the worst expected performance in terms of the number of livestock 180 
culled and outbreak cost was 3km ring vaccination (5.18 million livestock culled or £1,167 181 
million) and that with the best expected performance was 7km ring vaccination (4.04 million 182 
livestock culled or £891 million average cost). Under equal probability weightings the EVPI 183 
was 221,900 head or £55 million (5.8% and 6.6% of the expected value in the face of 184 
uncertainty respectively). If outbreak duration is the measure of interest, then 10km 185 
vaccination is preferred, though the EVPI was only 4.3 days (Table 1). 186 
 187 
Management 
objective 
3km 5km 7km 10km 15km EVPI (%) 
Livestock culled 5.18 4.28 4.04 4.09 4.42 0.23 (5.8%) 
Cost 1167 931 891 932 1057 55 (6.6%) 
Outbreak duration 277.3 256.3 247.1 242.8 243.9 4.3 (1.8%) 
 188 
 189 
Table 1: Expected livestock culled (million head), outbreak cost (£million) and 190 
outbreak duration (days) for each of the control strategies under the 191 
assumption of equal weighting across the 27 vaccination parameterisations.  192 
Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the management objective 193 
of interest and values in red represent the worst strategy. The final column shows the EVPI 194 
and % EVPI for each cost measure. 195 
 196 
The results indicate that the optimal vaccination strategy is highly dependent upon the daily 197 
vaccination capacity. With this in mind, we calculated the EVPXI for all of the model 198 
parameters under each management objective (S1-9 Table). Resolving uncertainty 199 
regarding the time delay to immunity resulted in no benefit in determining the optimal 200 
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control policy (S3, S6 and S9 Table), whilst resolving uncertainty in the vaccine efficacy 201 
resulted in modest gains (10.8% of the EVPI for outbreak duration (S1 Table) and 7.3% for 202 
livestock culled (S4 Table)). However, if one were able to resolve the uncertainty regarding 203 
the number of animals that could be vaccinated per day, this can result in significant benefits: 204 
88.7% of the EVPI can be recovered when considering outbreak duration (S2 Table), 89.7% 205 
for livestock culled (S5 Table) and 96.6% of the EVPI for epidemic cost (S8 Table). This 206 
indicates that, prior to a new outbreak of FMD, it is crucial to determine the capacity for 207 
administering vaccination, as this can have a significant influence upon the ability to 208 
determine the vaccination radius that should be implemented around all infected farms. 209 
 210 
Finally, we investigated the predictions of the optimal vaccination radius as two of the three 211 
vaccination assumptions were fixed at their intermediate values, whilst the weights on the 212 
assumptions for the remaining parameter were varied (Fig 3). When vaccine efficacy was set 213 
to 70% and capacity was set to 35000 animals per day, 15km and 7km vaccination was 214 
optimal to minimise epidemic duration and cost respectively, regardless of the weighting on 215 
the three time delay assumptions (Fig 3, left column, top and bottom panels). However, if 216 
we were interested in minimising the number of livestock culled, 7km vaccination was 217 
optimal unless the weight of belief on a 2 day delay was high, in which case 10km vaccination 218 
was optimal (Fig 3, left column, middle panel). A similar result was found when varying the 219 
weights on vaccine efficacy, with time delay fixed at 4 days and capacity at 35000 animals 220 
per day. Vaccination at 15km and 7km was again optimal for minimising outbreak duration 221 
and cost respectively (Fig 3, middle column, top and bottom panels). However, 7km 222 
vaccination was optimal for minimising the number of livestock culled, unless the weighting 223 
on 50% efficacy was high. In that case, 10km vaccination was again optimal (Fig 3, middle 224 
column middle panel). An alternative to fixing two of the three vaccination criteria to their 225 
intermediate value is averaging (calculating the mean) across the range of values for these 226 
criteria. The results of this analysis are shown in Supplementary Figure 2. We find 227 
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qualitatively similar results in this case, indicating that resolving uncertainty in the number 228 
of doses that can be administered per day is key to determining the optimal vaccination 229 
strategy. 230 
 231 
Fig 3: Ternary plots showing the control action which minimises the measure 232 
of management success shown in the respective row.  233 
Columns represent the specific vaccination assumption that is being varied (with the other 234 
two assumptions fixed at intermediate values). The edges of the individual ternary plots are 235 
the belief weight axes. Gridlines for tick marks on the belief weight axes run between one 236 
axis and the next axis anti-clockwise. Axis labels remain the same down each column.  237 
For instance, the ternary plot in the second row and third column shows the control action 238 
that minimises the number of livestock culled for different belief weights associated with 239 
vaccination capacity (with delay to immunity fixed at 4 days, and vaccine efficacy fixed at 240 
50%). For example, the top vertex of this plot shows that ring vaccination at 5km is optimal 241 
when the belief weight for a vaccination capacity of 20,000 doses per day is 100% (and zero 242 
on the other two levels).   243 
 244 
We saw dramatically different results when we varied the weights on the daily vaccination 245 
capacity (fixing time delay to 4 days and efficacy to 70%). In this case, large vaccination radii 246 
were found to be optimal when the weighting on the largest capacity, 50000 animals per 247 
day, was high, for all management objectives (Fig 3, right column). As the weight of belief 248 
on the lowest capacity increased, smaller vaccination radii become optimal. As more doses 249 
are available per day to carry out vaccination, it is possible to vaccinate in a larger area 250 
around each IP, thus creating a larger zone within which the susceptibility of the population 251 
is reduced. As the capacity decreases, the time taken to vaccinate farms in large rings will 252 
increase and this will also increase the risk of the virus escaping. This result adds support to 253 
the EVPXI results outlined above, that it is crucial to resolve uncertainty regarding 254 
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vaccination capacity in order to determine the optimal control policy. 255 
 256 
Discussion 257 
 258 
In the event of outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, vaccination is usually considered as 259 
part of a set of control strategies to reduce the impact of the epidemic. However, the adoption 260 
of vaccination as an active control measure is limited due to significant uncertainty 261 
regarding the effectiveness of vaccination in the field [19] and the resources available to 262 
carry out such a vaccination campaign. In the UK 2001 outbreak, the use of vaccination was 263 
contentious [10] and ultimately emergency FMD vaccination was not implemented.  Despite 264 
these uncertainties, vaccination remains part of the UK FMD contingency plan and would 265 
be considered for future outbreaks. 266 
 267 
In this paper, we have quantified the costs associated with uncertainty regarding three key 268 
factors: time delay to immunity after vaccination, the efficacy of the vaccine and the number 269 
of animals that can be vaccinated per day. Our results show that if uncertainty could be 270 
resolved a priori, this would result in an expected decrease of 4.3 days of outbreak duration, 271 
221,900 livestock culled and £55 million based on the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK. These 272 
simulations also show that all simulated vaccination strategies are worth considering in the 273 
event of a future outbreak of FMD in the UK as vaccination is expected to reduce the 274 
duration of an outbreak, the number of livestock culled and therefore the outbreak cost in 275 
comparison to IPDC culling alone. This is in agreement with previous work [12,13]. 276 
 277 
Using expected value of partial perfect information (EVPXI) analysis we established that 278 
there are minimal potential savings to be made through reducing uncertainty in the efficacy 279 
of FMD vaccination or the delay between vaccination and conferral of immunity. However, 280 
there are larger potential savings to be made by resolving the uncertainty surrounding the 281 
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daily vaccination capacity within the UK during an FMD epidemic. A clear understanding of 282 
daily capacity would also allow policy makers to make more informed decisions regarding 283 
the size of the vaccination ring that should be implemented. If there is confidence that 284 
vaccination capacity is low (20,000 doses per day), smaller vaccination rings of 5 or 7km are 285 
preferential. In contrast, if there is confidence that vaccination capacity is high (50,000 286 
doses per day) then there are the resources to rapidly vaccinate larger areas and 10 or 15km 287 
vaccination rings become the better strategy for minimising epidemic impact. By resolving 288 
the uncertainty surrounding vaccination capacity, we calculate that the majority of the EVPI 289 
(>85%) could be returned regardless of the management objective of interest. 290 
 291 
Such a result is relevant to outbreak control, because resolving the biological uncertainty 292 
surrounding FMD vaccination is likely to be expensive as it would involve extensive vaccine 293 
testing in livestock. Even with such research, there would likely still be unresolved 294 
uncertainty as vaccines may vary in efficacy dependent on factors such as the serotype of 295 
FMD that has caused the outbreak and the brand of vaccine that is being used. Such a result 296 
is also useful prior to an outbreak. It is relatively straightforward to resolve the uncertainty 297 
surrounding vaccine capacity within the UK through outbreak planning. Furthermore, our 298 
results show that higher capacity is generally better for all objectives. Contingency planning 299 
prior to an outbreak allows policy makers an opportunity to prepare and ensure sufficient 300 
capacity.  301 
 302 
In a real world situation, there may be the resources to vaccinate a known number of 303 
livestock daily but this may not be achievable depending on the spatial deployment of 304 
vaccination teams in comparison to the dynamics of the outbreak. For example, there may 305 
be a large difference between planned capacity and realised capacity if the outbreak is 306 
dispersed rather than localised. The model used to run these simulations did not take this 307 
partial controllability issue into account. Alternative FMD simulation models such as 308 
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AusSpread [20] take local resource limitations into account and including this within the 309 
Warwick model would give greater confidence in the accuracy of those results on a local 310 
level. It would also allow for other resource-limited factors to be considered, such as disposal 311 
capacity of culled carcasses.  312 
 313 
These simulations focused only on the uncertainty surrounding FMD vaccination as a 314 
control strategy whereas, in reality, there are many different uncertainties in an outbreak 315 
situation [6]. To conduct an EVPI analysis requires placing a belief weighting on each of 316 
these uncertainties, which may not be simple to do in practice. This could be improved if 317 
there was more knowledge about the different uncertainties that were considered. For 318 
example, knowing more about the range and belief weightings of potential vaccination 319 
capacities that could be available in a future FMD epidemic would allow for more accurate 320 
outbreak planning. 321 
 322 
The use of the cost function in this paper is a simplification of the real economic costs 323 
associated with an outbreak. Our main aim in including a cost function was to be able to 324 
represent the relative costs of culling compared with vaccination. As compensation costs for 325 
culling of livestock (cattle in particular) are generally much higher than costs associated with 326 
vaccination, strategies that include significant levels of vaccination may actually be more 327 
economical than strategies that involve culling of livestock alone. The vaccination cost 328 
estimation was based only on calculations of emergency vaccination cost for herds in the US 329 
[21] as there is a dearth of published data in this area. The culling costs were taken from 330 
within the compensation range reported from the 2001 outbreak as detailed extensively in 331 
the Lessons to be Learned Inquiry [10]. Both were only designed to be representative values 332 
and these would need to be updated in a real outbreak scenario.  There are also many other 333 
economic costs related to an FMD outbreak, such as those arising from export bans and 334 
losses to tourism. A more comprehensive cost function could be developed to take into 335 
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account the wider costs of an FMD epidemic, in particular the economic cost associated with 336 
longer export bans as soon as livestock are vaccinated against FMD and the more local 337 
impact on businesses in FMD affected areas throughout the duration of the outbreak. 338 
However, regardless of the measure used to determine management success, the same 339 
conclusion is reached, that resolving uncertainty regarding vaccine capacity is critical in 340 
determining the optimal control policy. 341 
 342 
In conclusion, these results indicate that emergency vaccination is an important control 343 
action to consider during an FMD outbreak situation despite the uncertainty surrounding 344 
vaccine behaviour. We show that the level of vaccine efficacy and the time delay to immunity 345 
has relatively little importance on the EVPI and the optimal control strategy. Therefore, 346 
whilst better information regarding efficacy and time delay will provide more accurate 347 
predictions of the number of farms and animals infected, more knowledge in these areas is 348 
not vital in order for policy makers and stakeholders to make decisions about the use of 349 
vaccination as a control policy. Reliable information on vaccination capacity should be 350 
obtained as soon as possible during an outbreak or, better yet, enhanced through 351 
contingency planning prior to an outbreak. This approach can also be employed to address 352 
similar issues for emergency vaccination campaigns for other diseases. 353 
 354 
Methods 355 
 356 
The Warwick FMD model was used to simulate several control measures under a range of 357 
scenarios across different levels of uncertainty surrounding vaccination assumptions [1].  358 
This stochastic, fully spatial, premises-based model was developed at the University of 359 
Cambridge during the 2001 UK FMD epidemic.  Since 2003 it has continued to be developed 360 
at the University of Warwick and has been widely used for investigating culling and 361 
vaccination strategies during outbreak scenarios [1,13,22–24]. See S1 Appendix for further 362 
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detail on the Warwick FMD model. 363 
 364 
Vaccination does not confer immediate nor complete immunity.  In an outbreak scenario, 365 
vaccine effectiveness and delay between vaccination and immunity may have an important 366 
effect on how useful an emergency vaccination response will be.  Equally, during an epidemic, 367 
resource limitation may restrict how many doses of vaccination can be delivered daily.  The 368 
Warwick model was adapted to investigate each of these possibilities. 369 
 370 
Previous work suggests that vaccine efficacy during an FMD outbreak can range from 60-371 
85% depending upon the serotype of the virus and the vaccine used [17,25]. In this paper, in 372 
order to capture this uncertainty, we considered the possibility that vaccination confers 90%, 373 
70% or 50% immunity. It was assumed that on vaccinated farms the proportion of cattle for 374 
which the vaccine was effective became completely immune and the remaining proportion 375 
stayed totally susceptible and were capable of infection by, and transmission of, the virus. 376 
In other words, for a model with 90% vaccine efficacy, vaccinated farms were assumed to 377 
have the same susceptibility and transmissibility as an unvaccinated farm with 10% of the 378 
number of cattle. 379 
 380 
There is also uncertainty about the time delay between vaccination and the conferral of 381 
immunity. Previous work shows that levels of virus neutralising antibodies rise rapidly 382 
between 2 and 6 days after vaccination [26]. Therefore, we considered the possibility of a 2, 383 
4 or 6 day delay between vaccination and the conferral of immunity. We assumed that 384 
during the delay time the vaccinated animals would be completely susceptible to FMD (and 385 
also fully capable of transmission), although this is a somewhat conservative estimate as 386 
immunity should build up over this time. After the delay period, the protected cattle were 387 
assumed to be completely immune and unable to transmit the virus.  388 
 389 
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The European Union FMD vaccine bank holds substantial supplies of vaccine, although in 390 
the midst of an outbreak it may not be possible for all identified animals to be vaccinated 391 
each day owing to resource limitations [27]. As Defra's (Department for Environment Food 392 
and Rural Affairs) daily expected capacity of emergency vaccination in the aftermath of the 393 
2001 FMD outbreak was thought to be around 35 000 doses per day [13], we considered the 394 
possibility of emergency vaccination capacity of 20 000, 35 000 and 50 000 doses per day. 395 
 396 
All combinations of these three parameters (vaccine efficacy, delay and capacity) were 397 
considered, giving 27 sets of assumptions regarding vaccination in total. We ran simulations 398 
using the FMD model to determine the effectiveness of ring vaccination for a range of ring 399 
sizes, in order to determine the optimal vaccination radius that should be introduced in the 400 
presence of uncertainty. In the event of ring vaccination being implemented, all farms within 401 
a given radius of an IP would be vaccinated, whilst IP and DC culling would also be carried 402 
out. Vaccination rings of 3km, 5km, 7km, 10km and 15km were considered. Vaccination in 403 
the model takes place firstly in the order in which IPs are reported and then from the outside 404 
of each ring moving in towards the centre. Alternative prioritisations for ring vaccination 405 
have been investigated elsewhere [13]. For each possible scenario, as well as a control 406 
scenario of IP and DC culling only (IPDC), 2000 simulations were conducted using the same 407 
state of the outbreak as that on the date that movement restrictions were introduced during 408 
the 2001 UK epidemic (23rd February 2001). 409 
 410 
In the event of an outbreak of infectious disease, policy makers will make a control decision 411 
based upon a set of management objectives. Dependent upon the outbreak scenario, these 412 
objectives may range from minimising the duration of the epidemic, the total number of 413 
individuals infected or the total economic cost of an outbreak. With this in mind, we have 414 
considered three different management objectives, with the caveat that true objectives in the 415 
event of an outbreak may be more complex than those investigated here. The first objective 416 
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we considered was to minimise the duration of the epidemic (in days). This is likely to lead 417 
to severe culling strategies being preferred in order to quickly ‘stamp out’ the epidemic but 418 
this also causes large livestock losses. Therefore, our second objective of interest was 419 
minimising total livestock culled. In this scenario, policy makers may be more likely to 420 
favour mass vaccination strategies. However, costs are often an important factor when 421 
deciding on control strategies so for the final management objective we considered 422 
minimising outbreak cost, focusing on the costs of culling and vaccinating livestock. We used 423 
a previously developed cost function designed to measure the cost of culling livestock [5] 424 
and included a term for the cost of vaccination. The estimate of the cost of the control 425 
measures was calculated using:   426 
 , ,1000M 100M 20Mculled cattle culled sheep vaccinatedC      427 
Here, C is the cost in pounds sterling, Mculled,cattle is the total number of cattle culled, 428 
Mculled,sheep is the total number of sheep culled and Mvaccinated is the total number of cattle 429 
vaccinated in the simulation models. From the 2001 Lessons to be Learned Inquiry [10], 430 
compensation costs for culled cattle ranged from £150 to £1100, whilst compensation costs 431 
for sheep ranged from £32 to £150. In line with previous work [5], we estimated the aver-432 
age compensation costs to be £1000 per culled cow and £100 per culled sheep, which rep-433 
resents an intermediate value in the compensation cost range from 2001. Should vaccina-434 
tion be implemented in the UK, it is likely to be only targeted at cattle owing to the high 435 
values associated with cattle herds [13]. We therefore base our vaccination costs on an esti-436 
mate of the cost of emergency FMD vaccination of small herds of cattle in the United 437 
States [21], with an average estimated cost of £20 per vaccinated animal. Whilst we accept 438 
that the actual cost associated with livestock epidemics is more complex than that stated 439 
here, our aim in this paper is not to determine the actual ‘best’ vaccination policy to imple-440 
ment for a livestock disease outbreak, but to understand the impact of uncertainty in con-441 
trol actions upon a model’s ability to provide policy recommendations.  442 
 443 
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If all parameter combinations generate model results that are in agreement about the 444 
optimal action, then the decision can be made without further analysis. When there is 445 
disagreement under varying assumptions, the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) 446 
can calculate the theoretical maximum achievable benefit of resolving uncertainty. The EVPI 447 
is the difference between the expected value with uncertainty (the action with the best 448 
weighted average over all parameter combinations) and the expected value without 449 
uncertainty (the weighted average of the optimum outcome over all parameter 450 
combinations), and is calculated as: 451 
 [min ( , )] min [ ( , )]s a a sEVPI E V a s E V a s    452 
where a is the control action taken, s is the parameter combination, V(a,s) is the value of 453 
action a under parameter combination s, and min is the minimum over all potential actions 454 
for the chosen value function of interest (livestock culled, cost or outbreak duration) [5,6].  455 
The reader should note, especially when comparing to other texts, that here all values are 456 
expected to be minimized and hence the EVPI will be a negative value (if the operator was a 457 
maximum, EVPI would be a positive value). EVPI analyses were conducted using either 458 
outbreak duration, livestock culled or cost as the management objective of interest, and 459 
assuming equal belief weightings for each outcome.     460 
 461 
The expected value of partial perfect information (EVPXI) can be used to identify how much 462 
each individual parameter contributes to the overall decision problem [5]. It is calculated as: 463 
( ) ,
[min [ ( , , )]] min [ ( , , )]c c
i i i i i
c c
s s a i i a i is s s
EVPXI E E V a s s E V a s s   464 
where si is a subset of parameter combinations and sic is its complement [5,6]. We calculated 465 
EVPXI for each of the three parameters in turn whilst there remained uncertainty 466 
surrounding the other two parameters. This allowed us to identify the expected value of 467 
completely resolving uncertainty for that particular parameter.   468 
 469 
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The optimal control strategy was also calculated across a range of different belief weightings 470 
for each of the three management objectives. We considered each parameter independently, 471 
by changing that parameter but keeping the other two fixed at the middle value of the three 472 
under consideration (e.g. for vaccine efficacy we consider 50%/70%/90% whilst delay 473 
remains at 4 days and capacity is fixed at 35,000 doses per day). These middle values were 474 
chosen as they were judged to be closest to the true values based on the existing literature 475 
[13,17,25,26]. We also calculated the average optimal control strategy by changing one 476 
parameter and taking the average results of all the model simulations (e.g. for vaccine 477 
efficacy we calculated the mean of all the results for varying time delay to immunity and 478 
vaccine capacity as the weight of belief regarding vaccine efficacy varies). 479 
 480 
Acknowledgements 481 
We would like to thank Defra for supplying the data. Any use of trade, product, or firm 482 
names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. 483 
Government. 484 
 485 
References 486 
1. Keeling MJ, Woolhouse MEJ, Shaw DJ, Matthews L, Chase-Topping M, Haydon DT, et al. 487 
Dynamics of the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth Epidemic: Stochastic Dispersal in a 488 
Heterogeneous Landscape. Science. 2001 Oct 26;294(5543):813–7.  489 
2. Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Anderson RM. The foot-and-mouth epidemic in Great 490 
Britain: pattern of spread and impact of interventions. Science. 2001;292(5519):1155–60.  491 
3. Morris RS, Stern MW, Stevenson MA, Wilesmith JW, Sanson RL. Predictive spatial 492 
modelling of alternative control strategies for the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Great 493 
Britain, 2001. Vet Rec. 2001 Aug 4;149(5):137–44.  494 
4. Yokota F, Thompson KM. Value of information literature analysis: a review of applications 495 
in health risk management. Med Decis Making. 2004;24(3):287–98.  496 
 20 
5. Runge MC, Converse SJ, Lyons JE. Which uncertainty? Using expert elicitation and 497 
expected value of information to design an adaptive program. Biol Conserv. 498 
2011;144(4):1214–23.  499 
6. Shea K, Tildesley MJ, Runge MC, Fonnesbeck CJ, Ferrari MJ. Adaptive management and 500 
the value of information: Learning via intervention in epidemiology. PLoS Biol. 501 
2014;12(10):e1001970.  502 
7. Cox LA, Popken DA, VanSickle JJ, Sahu R. Optimal Tracking and Testing of US and 503 
Canadian Herds for BSE: A Value‐of‐Information (VOI) Approach. Risk Anal. 504 
2005;25(4):827–40.  505 
8. De Gourville E, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Sangrujee N, Pallansch MA, Thompson KM. Global 506 
Surveillance and the Value of Information: The Case of the Global Polio Laboratory Network. 507 
Risk Anal. 2006 Dec 1;26(6):1557–69.  508 
9. Keeling MJ. Models of foot-and-mouth disease. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2005 Jun 509 
22;272(1569):1195–202.  510 
10. Anderson I. Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report. 2002.  511 
11. Knight-Jones T, Rushton J. The economic impacts of foot and mouth disease–What are 512 
they, how big are they and where do they occur? Prev Vet Med. 2013;112(3):161–73.  513 
12. Keeling MJ, Woolhouse MEJ, May RM, Davies G, Grenfell BT. Modelling vaccination 514 
strategies against foot-and-mouth disease. Nature. 2003 Jan 9;421(6919):136–42.  515 
13. Tildesley MJ, Savill NJ, Shaw DJ, Deardon R, Brooks SP, Woolhouse ME, et al. Optimal 516 
reactive vaccination strategies for a foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK. Nature. 517 
2006;440(7080):83–6.  518 
14. Roche S, Garner M, Sanson R, Cook C, Birch C, Backer J, et al. Evaluating vaccination 519 
strategies to control foot-and-mouth disease: a model comparison study. Epidemiol Infect. 520 
2015;143(06):1256–75.  521 
15. Paté-Cornell ME. Uncertainties in risk analysis: Six levels of treatment. Reliab Eng Syst 522 
Saf. 1996;54(2):95–111.  523 
 21 
16. Regan HM, Colyvan M, Burgman MA. A taxonomy and treatment of uncertainty for 524 
ecology and conservation biology. Ecol Appl. 2002;12(2):618–28.  525 
17. Knight-Jones TJD, Bulut AN, Gubbins S, Stärk KDC, Pfeiffer DU, Sumption KJ, et al. 526 
Retrospective evaluation of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine effectiveness in Turkey. Vaccine. 527 
2014;32(16):1848–55.  528 
18. Probert WJM, Shea K, Fonnesbeck CJ, Runge MC, Carpenter TE, Dürr S, et al. Decision-529 
making for foot-and-mouth disease control: Objectives matter. Epidemics. 2016 Jun;15:10–530 
9.  531 
19. Halasa T, Boklund A, Cox S, Enøe C. Meta-analysis on the efficacy of foot-and-mouth 532 
disease emergency vaccination. Prev Vet Med. 2011 Jan 1;98(1):1–9.  533 
20. Garner MG, Beckett SD. Modelling the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in Australia. 534 
Aust Vet J. 2005;83(12):758–66.  535 
21. Hagerman AD, McCarl BA, Carpenter TE, Ward MP, O’Brien J. Emergency vaccination 536 
to control foot-and-mouth disease: implications of its inclusion as a US policy option. Appl 537 
Econ Perspect Policy. 2012;34(1):119–46.  538 
22. Porphyre T, Auty HK, Tildesley MJ, Gunn GJ, Woolhouse ME. Vaccination against foot-539 
and-mouth disease: do initial conditions affect its benefit? PloS One. 2013;8(10):e77616.  540 
23. Tildesley MJ, Bessell PR, Keeling MJ, Woolhouse ME. The role of pre-emptive culling in 541 
the control of foot-and-mouth disease. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2009;276:3239–48.  542 
24. Tildesley MJ, Deardon R, Savill NJ, Bessell PR, Brooks SP, Woolhouse ME., et al. 543 
Accuracy of models for the 2001 foot-and-mouth epidemic. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2008 544 
Jun 22;275(1641):1459–68.  545 
25. Jamal SM, Bouma A, van den Broek J, Stegeman A, Chénard G, Dekker A. Foot-and-546 
mouth disease vaccine potency testing: The influence of serotype, type of adjuvant, valency, 547 
fractionation method, and virus culture on the dose–response curve in cattle. Vaccine. 2008 548 
Nov 25;26(50):6317–21.  549 
26. Carr BV, Lefevre EA, Windsor MA, Inghese C, Gubbins S, Prentice H, et al. CD4+ T-cell 550 
 22 
responses to foot-and-mouth disease virus in vaccinated cattle. J Gen Virol. 2013;94(Pt 1):97.  551 
27. DEFRA. Foot and Mouth Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain. 2011.  552 
 553 
Supporting information captions 554 
 555 
S1 Fig: Projected mean outbreak duration (days) under various vaccination 556 
ring radii (columns) and vaccination parameterisations (rows).  557 
Rows represent different combinations of parameters regarding vaccination efficacy, 558 
vaccination capacity (number of animals vaccinated per day), and the delay (in days) from 559 
administering vaccination and conferral of immunity. Results have been presented rounded 560 
to the nearest integer value with the optimal strategy selected prior to rounding. Outlined 561 
values denote the optimal control action for a given set of vaccination assumptions.   562 
 563 
S1 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 564 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak duration when there 565 
is uncertainty about vaccine efficacy  566 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding vaccine efficacy.  Values 567 
in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the outbreak duration (in days) 568 
and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 569 
 570 
S2 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 571 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak duration when there 572 
is uncertainty about vaccine capacity  573 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding daily vaccination 574 
capacity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the outbreak 575 
duration (in days) and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 576 
 577 
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S3 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 578 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak duration when there 579 
is uncertainty about vaccine delay 580 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding delay between 581 
vaccination and conferral of immunity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy 582 
to minimise the outbreak duration (in days) and values in red represent the worst 583 
performing strategy. 584 
 585 
S4 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 586 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising livestock culled when there is 587 
uncertainty about vaccine efficacy 588 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding vaccine efficacy.  Values 589 
in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the livestock culled (million head) 590 
and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 591 
 592 
S5 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 593 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising livestock culled when there is 594 
uncertainty about vaccine capacity 595 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding daily vaccination 596 
capacity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the livestock 597 
culled (million head) and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 598 
 599 
S6 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 600 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising livestock culled when there is 601 
uncertainty about vaccine delay 602 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding delay between 603 
vaccination and conferral of immunity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy 604 
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to minimise the livestock culled (million head) and values in red represent the worst 605 
performing strategy. 606 
 607 
S7 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 608 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak cost when there is 609 
uncertainty about vaccine efficacy 610 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding vaccine efficacy.  Values 611 
in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the cost (£ million) and values in 612 
red represent the worst performing strategy. 613 
 614 
S8 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 615 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak cost when there is 616 
uncertainty about vaccine capacity 617 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding daily vaccination 618 
capacity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy to minimise the cost 619 
(£ million) and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 620 
 621 
S9 Table: Values for calculating the expected value of partial perfect 622 
information (EVPXI) for the case of minimising outbreak cost when there is 623 
uncertainty about vaccine delay 624 
Expected value of partial perfect information calculations regarding delay between 625 
vaccination and conferral of immunity.  Values in blue represent the optimal control strategy 626 
to minimise the cost (£ million) and values in red represent the worst performing strategy. 627 
 628 
S2 Figure: Ternary plots showing the control action that minimises the average 629 
(mean) measure of management success shown in the respective row.  630 
Columns represent the specific vaccination assumption that is being varied. The edges of the 631 
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individual ternary plots are the belief weight axes. Gridlines for tick marks on the belief 632 
weight axes run between one axis and the next axis anti-clockwise. Axis labels remain the 633 
same down each column. For instance, the ternary plot in the second row and third column 634 
shows the control action that minimises the number of livestock culled for different belief 635 
weights associated with vaccination capacity. 636 
 637 
S1 Appendix: Further detail on the Warwick FMD model 638 
 639 
S1 Data: Data analysed and presented in this paper generated from Warwick 640 
FMD model simulations 641 
